Perspectives on Political Party Death:Theorizing and Testing Downsian and Sociological Rationales by Bolleyer, Nicole et al.
Roskilde
University
Perspectives on Political Party Death
Theorizing and Testing Downsian and Sociological Rationales
Bolleyer, Nicole; Ibenskas, Raimondas ; Bischoff, Carina Saxlund
Published in:







Citation for published version (APA):
Bolleyer, N., Ibenskas, R., & Bischoff, C. S. (2019). Perspectives on Political Party Death: Theorizing and
Testing Downsian and Sociological Rationales . European Political Science Review, 11(1), 19-35.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773918000176
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact rucforsk@ruc.dk providing details, and we will remove access to the
work immediately and investigate your claim.





 Perspectives on Political Party Death:  




Nicole Bolleyer, University of Exeter (n.bolleyer@ex.ac.uk) 
 
Raimondas Ibenskas, University of Southampton (R.Ibenskas@soton.ac.uk) 
 







Which of the new political parties that emerged in advanced democracies faded away and 
which ones managed to survive and why? Considering a party as dead once it ceases to 
nominate candidates in any elections, we develop two sets of hypotheses to account for party 
death derived from two conceptions of political parties. One conceptualizes parties as 
vehicles formed by career-oriented politicians eager to maximize individual rewards. Failure 
to deliver seats or government access is therefore expected to predict an earlier death. The 
other conceptualizes parties as societal organizations that serve representational functions 
valued in themselves by elites and members alike. This conception stresses the importance of 
roots in society or ideological novelty. Using survival analysis, we test our hypotheses in 17 
advanced democracies based on a new dataset covering 144 new parties from birth until their 
(potential) death. Arguments derived from both conceptions have significant support 













Cross-national research on advanced democracies has produced excellent work on new party 
formation and entry, their electoral and parliamentary performance as well as government 
participation1. However, more fundamental questions about the survival of new parties  are 
surprisingly rarely dealt with (but see Collignon 2018; Lowery et al 2013; Rose and Mackie 
1988; on new democracies Bakke and Sitter 2015; Casal Bértoa and Spirova 2017; Cyr 2016; 
Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2015). Drivers of party death and survival shed light on the 
fundamental question of how we should theorize what political parties are. Indeed, core party 
actors are likely to dissolve their party only when they perceive the raison d’être of their 
organization’s existence to be fundamentally undermined. What defines this raison d’être - 
the core motivations that underpin a party’s very existence - depends on the conception of 
parties we start out with (Mudge and Chen 2014: 310-2).  
This is why in this paper we develop two sets of hypotheses on party death building on two 
contrasting conceptions of political parties co-existing in the literature for many decades, one 
originating in Downs’ economic theory of democracy (1957), the other in Lipset and 
Rokkan’s seminal work on party systems (1967). Are parties best understood as a “team of 
men seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office” (Downs 1957: 25), as 
careerist vehicles composed of ambitious politicians driven by the pursuit of individual 
rewards? Or do they bear stronger resemblance to “alliances in conflicts over policies and 
value commitments” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 5) sustained by followers committed to build 
support for a collectively shared ideology or group interest?  
                                                          
1 See, for instance, Akkerman and de Lange 2012; Biezen and Rashkova 2013; Bolin 2007; Deschouwer 2008; 





Especially, comparative party research is strongly shaped by the Downsian conception. As 
Bawn et al put it, “[c]ontemporary scholarship views a party as a team of politicians whose 
paramount goal is to win electoral office” (2012: 571; see also Aldrich 1995: 4; Müller and 
Strøm 1999). This rationalist, office-driven conception of parties formed and sustained by 
self-interested individuals underpins – implicitly or explicitly - many large-N studies on new 
party performance (e.g. Tavits 2006; Hug 2001; Harmel and Robertson 1985). This also 
includes recent studies that stress the need to overcome the treatment of parties as unitary 
actors (often associated with this rationalist conception) and show how intra-organizational 
factors shape parties’ strategic choices and their long-term evolution, for instance, in terms of 
the programmatic profile they adopt (Schumacher et al 2015; Spoon 2011; Tavits 2013). As 
detailed below, this Downsian conception of parties provides a rationalist, office-driven 
rationale allowing us to derive hypotheses on party death.  
This account contrasts with works following sociological traditions, which approach political 
parties as societal organizations driven by group goals rather than individual interest-
maximization (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 5; Monroe 2001: 20-1; Mudge and Chen 2014: 310; 
Bawn et al 2012: 571; see also Kitschelt 1989; Panebianco 1988). Works taking this 
perspective are predominantly qualitative and small-N. In contrast, the interest group 
literature has applied this conception more broadly to account for mortality or organizations’ 
anxiety thereof, distinguishing central resource dimensions crucial to an organization’s 
viability such as a distinctive area of competence (comparable to a party’s ideological niche) 
(Gray and Lowery 1997: 28). We make this sociological conception useful by developing 
hypotheses on party death centring around a party’s (in)ability to fulfil its representation 






To derive hypotheses from both rationales is important as the assumptions about the core 
motivations that underpin a political party’s very existence, as associated with the Downsian 
and the sociological conceptions, are usually not tested by themselves.  Unlike the study of 
parties constitutive for fully institutionalized party systems that have lasted many decades and 
rarely die (hence do not allow to examine party death), the study of the evolution of 144 new 
parties – irrespective of their origins, durability or ideological profile – over the course of 
more than four decades in 17 established party systems opens a window of opportunity: it 
allows us to examine the drivers of party death in an encompassing fashion. It allows us to go 
beyond the study of parties’ relative success – the dominant focus of existing research - to 
explore what fundamentally sustains them, by covering these parties’ whole life cycle from 
their birth to their (potential) ‘death’ (Pedersen 1982).   
This is important not only theoretically but also empirically. Only new parties that contest 
more than a few elections can broaden the offer of the party system and may have a direct or 
indirect impact on policy-making, by entering government or by triggering shifts in the offer 
of mainstream parties (e.g. Meguid 2007; Mudde 2007). Only once knowing which types of 
new parties tend to die and survive and why, can we truly evaluate the implications of the rise 
of new parties for representative democracy, in which support for mainstream parties has 
been suffering over the last decades, (e.g. Dalton and Wattenberg 2002). More particularly, 
whether Downsian or sociological drivers of party death finds more support has important 
empirical implications for which type of change new parties are likely to introduce in 
established party systems and the way they contribute to representative democracy 
undergoing significant societal change. Essentially, it reveals whether new parties 
predominantly exploit on-going processes of dealignment and the decline of mainstream 





sociological rationale) contribute to the formation of new, lasting linkages to societal groups 
and thereby enhance the representational capacity of established party systems. 
In the next section, we develop two sets of hypotheses derived from two distinct conceptions 
of political party co-existing in the literature.  After that, we present the indicators, the data-
set and methods used to test these hypotheses. Then, we examine – using survival analysis, 
the patterns of death and survival of 144 organizationally new parties formed in or after 1968 
in 17 democracies. We conclude with a discussion of our findings and of avenues of future 
research. 
 
Theory: Two Conceptions of Political Party and Drivers of Party Death 
Defining Party Death 
Participating in elections by nominating candidates for public office is a key characteristic of 
political parties, which sets them apart from organizations such as interest groups (Sartori, 
1976). A party survives as long as it takes part in elections, irrespective of the governmental 
tier – national, regional or local (Rose and Mackie 1988: 539; Spoon 2011: 16-17; Cyr 2016: 
129; Collignon 2018). Consequently, we define a party as dead when it permanently ceases to 
nominate candidates for any electoral contest as a separate, autonomous organization.2  
 
                                                          
2 Importantly, this definition is – beyond a party’s ability to assure any form of electoral participation (which is 
a precondition but not a predictor of its success) - not based on performance indicators related to electoral 
success, parliamentary representation or the ability to sustain a presence on the national level as other 
specifications of ‘death’ or ‘disappearance’ used in earlier work (e.g. Lowery et al 2013: 388; Beyens et al 2016: 
259; van de Wardt et al 2017: 246). This makes this definition particularly suitable to test Downsian against 
sociological drivers of party death, as a performance-based specification would bias the results towards the 
Downsian model. Furthermore, when operationalising party death, we often uncovered information indicating 





Downsian and Sociological Rationales of Party Death 
To develop a series of systematic hypotheses on drivers of party death, we start from the core 
motivations of those actors instrumental to forming and sustaining a party (Mudge and Chen 
2014: 310-2; Krouwel and Lucardie 2008). These motivations – or ends - constitute the 
raison d’etre of a party and allow us to identify conditions most central to a party’s 
continued survival and conditions whose absence are, in turn, likely to lead to a party’s death. 
To identify those conditions we use the Downsian conception of parties as careerist vehicles 
and the sociological conception of parties as “alliances in conflicts over policies and value 
commitments” directed towards fulfilling important mobilisation and representative functions 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 5; Enyedi 2005: 699) as analytical devices.3 Instead of 
representing rivalling accounts, the two conceptions (each of which is inevitably a 
simplification of ‘reality’) serve as heuristic tools to generate systematic expectations 
regarding which particular factors are likely to be immediately important – in light of the 
respective conception - to account for whether core actors within a party maintain their 
organization through assuring ongoing electoral participation or not. This perspective starting 
out from parties’ core motivations stresses the importance of party agency when theorizing 
the decision to continue investing the resources necessary to build and maintain an active 
party organization or to cease to do so (Enyedi 2005; de Lange and Art 2011; Bolleyer 
2013).4 
                                                          
3 The latter perspective aligns with the ‘group coalition view’ of political parties developed in the US context 
conceiving of parties as intense policy demanders underpinned by activists and aligned groups (Cohen et al 
2008; Bawn et al 2012). 
4 The challenge of sustaining a party is likely to decrease with a party’s increasing age and on-going 
institutionalization, i.e. the longer a party survives, the more likely its persistence becomes, also because core 
actors have invested considerable resources in the past and there is a tendency to continue doing so. This makes 
organizational or programmatic changes more likely responses to crises, with the decision to dissolve 





More specifically, each conception allows us to distinguish factors or conditions that are 
merely desirable for core party actors (and might be important for explaining party strategy, 
for instance) from those that are likely to motivate core party actors to dissolve their party as 
they see the latter’s raison d’être as fundamentally undermined. This distinction is important 
as, for instance, parliamentary seats are desirable and helpful to any party to realize its goals, 
including those parties predominantly aspiring to represent group interests in line with the 
sociological conception. However, seats are only one means and parliament only one arena 
among several towards the end of engaging in representative activities (Saward 2009)5. Thus, 
starting out from a sociological conception, we would expect access to seats to be less 
decisive for party actors’ determination to sustain their organization than, for example, a 
party’s societal roots and its ideological identity. If, however, we consider parties as career 
instruments to self-interested politicians in line with the Downsian conception of parties 
instead, we would expect the inability to win seats (or access government) to motivate wide-
spread defection likely to trigger party death (as the aspiration of winning office is considered 





                                                                                                                                                                                    
apparent, dissolution can be expected to become an option. Echoing this, some parties indeed die late in their 
life cycle (see Figure 1). 
5 This line of argument makes clear that our distinction between Downsian and sociological conceptions of 
political party resembles but is not equivalent to an “office-oriented” vs. “policy-oriented” conception of parties. 
Group representation as associated with the sociological conception of party transcends the formulation and 
implementation of “policy” and also contains agenda setting through the highlighting of issues, i.e. which does 






Table 1: Drivers of Party Death 
 Downsian Account of Party Death Sociological Account of Party Death 
 
Central End/ raison 
d’être of Conception 
of Political Party 
 
Maximization of individual rewards 
 
Joint representation of group interests/ 
collectively shared values  
 
Formation Variables 
Aligned with Central 
End 
 
Insider formation (involving 
parliamentarian(s))   death more 
likely 
 
Rooted formation (promoted by pre-
existing societal groups) death less 
likely 
Ideologically novel formation  






Seats  death less likely 
Government access  death less 
likely 
 
Distinctive ideological profile   death 
less likely 
 
In the following we theorize the two sets of factors respectively. Each set is derived from one 
conception of political party, as distinguished by the dominant (not necessarily only) end that 
actors running a party are assumed to strive for predominantly.6 The factors forming part of 
each account of party death can be divided in two groups respectively, one time-invariant, the 
other time-variant. First, each conception (characterized by a specific motivational 
underpinning) is closely associated with the way an organization is formed, as the latter 
captures who is involved in a formation for what reasons (e.g. Duverger 1959;  Lucardie 
2000; Krouwel and Lucardie and Ghillebaert 2008). Formative characteristics defining what a 
party is for should be immediately relevant for any evaluation of if and when a party has 
failed to meet its constitutive purpose. Second, by specifying one central end, each 
                                                          
6 While echoing the distinction between parties as electoral vehicle and societal organizations by Bolleyer 
(2013), her ‘electoral notion’ was not systematically derived from Downs, neither was the societal conception 
based on Lipset and Rokkan, which is why we start out from Mudge and Chen (2014).  Given a different 
conceptual foundation, the variables included in her analysis of party death are not identical. Moreover, her 





conception allows us to theorize those factors that are direct realizations of, or constitutive 
for, such ends. Table 1 summarizes the two accounts of party death. All factors associated 
with the Downsian conception and the sociological account, and how they are expected to 
shape party death, are detailed below. 
 
The Downsian Rationale of Party Death - Hypotheses  
Theorizing formative conditions closely aligned with the Downsian notion of parties, 
Duverger has famously argued that parties formed by parliamentarians distinguish themselves 
in terms of their organization, finances and evolution from parties formed without such 
‘insider’ support (1959: 290-1). Developing this argument further, Krouwel and Lucardie 
(2008: 283) argued that this is the case as in parties formed by parliamentarians, their 
‘strategic’ or ‘personal ambitions’ – both short-term orientations - are likely to be dominant. 
This, in turn, makes long-term investments in a lasting party infrastructure which is then able 
to outlive the founding elites less likely (should the latter decide to leave). Indeed, 
parliamentarians forming their own party often do so after defecting from another party 
because they could not exercise the level of influence they envisioned (Ceron 2015). While 
parliamentarians might have ties to societal groups or not, the core of the argument is that the 
motivational structure underpinning insider formations created with the central involvement 
of professional politicians is defined by career aspirations central to our Downsian conception 
of a political party, making long-term structural investments less likely. The lack of such 
investments increases the risk of party death. 
H1.1 (Insider Formation Hypothesis): Parties formed by parliamentarians are more likely to 






Individual rewards in the form of office are the central end for party actors driven by the 
maximization of such rewards. Consequently, while electoral support signals to party elites 
that institutional access might be within reach, whether the votes bring tangible rewards from 
party elites’ point of view depends on their translation into seats that can be allocated to 
central figures in the party (usually the first national seat a new formation wins is taken over 
by the party leader). Thus, what matters to elites is the party’s institutional access – both in 
terms of seats and government - rather than its mere electoral performance (Mayhew 1974; 
Obert and Müller 2017). While winning many seats too early on can be destabilizing for new 
parties (Bolleyer 2013), the Downsian rationale suggests that MPs can be expected to make 
stronger efforts to keep their party going and assure its success, efforts that are directed 
towards assuring their own reelection, than elites who remained outside public office. 
Consequently, the more party actors benefit from parliamentary seats (incentivized to sustain 
their organization), the more the party is likely to profit, thereby reducing the risk of its death. 
The same rationale applies to government access as the ultimate locus of power and 
prestige. For ambitious politicians, seats in parliament might be little more than a stepping 
stone on the way to the ultimate reward, the take-over of ministerial posts. The literature is 
divided regarding the merits and perils of government participation for new political parties 
as organizations: for some parties the access to government had destabilizing or 
disintegrating effects, on others, strengthening effects (e.g. Deschouwer 2008; Bale and 
Dunphy 2011; de Lange and Art 2011; Bolleyer et al 2012). Yet starting out from a 
Downsian conception, what matters is how members of the party elite respond to government 
access because such access constitutes a major reward (Müller and Strøm 1999). Once 





holders can be assumed to be highly motivated to sustain their party’s core activities to assure 
re-entry into government, efforts which should make party death less likely.7 
This leads us to two further hypotheses on the risk of party death derived from the Downsian 
perspective: 
H1.2 (Seat Share Hypothesis): Parties with a higher seat share are less likely to die than 
parties with lower seat shares. 
H1.3 (Government Access Hypothesis): Parties with government access are less likely to die 
than parties without. 
 
The Sociological Rationale of Party Death - Hypotheses 
If parties are formed as societal organizations to represent and give voice to issues or groups 
within society as well as the institutional arena, two characteristics in a party’s origin can be 
expected to be relevant for the risk of party death. First, it is important whether the new 
formation is supported by a promoter organization already established in civil society in 
pursuit of a collective goal which the newly formed party carries into the electoral arena. The 
second formative feature of relevance is whether a party has an ideologically novel profile. 
Both these formative characteristics are likely to decrease the risk of death as the motivations 
of their founders are more likely to be ‘ideological’ or ‘altruistic societal’ (Krouwel and 
Lucardie 2008: 283; Spoon 2011: 27-28), motivations that suggest a commitment to long-
term policy goals as opposed to an orientation towards short-term rewards.  
                                                          
7 While office-holders face the strongest and most immediate incentives towards sustaining their party following 
a Downsian perspective, ambitious office-aspirants can also be expected to invest more time and effort in 
building their career in a party that is able to win significant seats shares and to enter government than in a party 





Regardless of whether their cause is fascist, religious or environmental, promoter 
organizations provide access to a pool of committed activists able to fill positions in the new 
party (e.g. Rose and Mackie 1988;  Poguntke 2002; Art 2011). They decrease a party’s 
dependence on a particular leader or core elite, while party elites affiliated to promoter 
organizations (which tend to represent broader collective interests that require political 
representation in the longer run) are less likely to build an organization for the sole purpose 
of advancing their careers. Both aspects make it more likely for the organization to outlive 
the same elites. Simultaneously, followers are less likely to defect if their individual interests 
clash with organizational demands, as affiliations to already established promoter groups 
function as a first ‘natural pre-selection mechanism’ for an organization that initially has very 
little capacity to identify and weed out opportunists (Art 2011).  
A novel ideological profile is another beneficial ‘formative feature’ we expect to decrease the 
risk of death. Ideological novelty (being a party introducing a new set of issues or a new 
ideology formerly unrepresented by other parties) helps new parties not only to mobilize 
initial support but also to cultivate lasting (non-instrumental) loyalties among their followers 
(e.g. Lucardie 2000; Abedi 2004; Meguid 2007; Spoon 2011; Lowery et al 2013). Adams et 
al. (2007: 514-15; 525) have more specifically shown that niche parties – usually 
characterized by novelty - respond less to shifts in public opinion. This should help them to 
maintain the ownership of core issues by making it more difficult for competitors to highjack 
their issues, which, in turn, makes it more likely for novel new parties to occupy a separate 
niche in their party system in the longer term (Meguid 2007; Spoon 2011).   
This leads us to two hypotheses on formative party characteristics closely aligned with the 






H2.1 (Societal Roots Hypothesis): Parties formed with the support of pre-existing societal 
organizations are less likely to die than parties without.  
H2.2 (Novel Formation Hypothesis): Parties formed with a novel ideological profile are less 
likely to die than parties without. 
Irrespective of whether new parties are novel formations, whether a party (old or new) can 
engage in representative activity meaningful to its members and supporters in the long term is 
likely to depend on whether it is confronted with the emergence of a credible competitor from 
the same party family (Ladrech 2012: 17-18). If a party’s main purpose is indeed to represent 
societal constituencies that need representation according to the sociological conception, the 
fact that the demands of this constituency are represented by another party should increase 
the risk of party death (rather than incentivizing the strategic adaptation of the party’s 
representative profile suggested by the Downsian rationale).8 While novel formations, by 
definition, do not have a credible competitor at the time of their formation, such a competitor 
(e.g. a second anti-immigrant party) might emerge within a few election cycles and thereby 
weaken its ‘novelty advantage’. Vice versa, a new liberal party does not possess a novelty 
advantage as it represents an old ideology, but it still can profit from a ‘distinctiveness 
advantage’ in periods in which no viable liberal party exists in its party system. 
H2.3 (Distinctiveness Advantage Hypothesis): Parties that do not face a competitor party 
belonging to the same party family, hence, are ideologically distinct, are less likely to die 
than parties that are not. 
                                                          
8 This rationale is very different from Downsian spatial theory in which policy is a means to the end of 
maximizing votes and parties are expected to adapt their policy position when facing competitors to differentiate 
themselves. Starting from the sociological conception, this leeway to change  a party’s  ‘policy offer’ is much 
more restricted assuming a party’s accountability to a societal constituency whose interests it represents than in 







Definition of New Parties and Empirical Scope of the Analysis 
We define new parties by referring to their organizational age. Organizationally new parties 
still need to build a viable, self-sufficient infrastructure consolidated by a (relatively) stable 
support base, which makes these parties more vulnerable than, and thus distinct from, the 
group of established or ‘organizationally mature’ parties (e.g. Mair 1990). Parties are newly 
created if they are built from scratch (‘newly born’), i.e. formed without the help of members 
of existing parties (Hug 2001: 13), through mergers in which newly born parties participate 
and splits from old parties9, i.e. parties that faced or still face the challenge to build a viable 
infrastructure. Mergers between old parties and successor parties– being able to rely on more 
extensive infrastructures and resources – are excluded.10  
Following Bolleyer and Bytzek (2013), we identified new formations meeting these criteria 
from 1968 onwards as party systems in long-lived democracies were considered “frozen”, 
hence ‘stable’, up to the 1960s. However, citizens’ party affiliations underpinning these party 
systems started to de-align in the latter period of that decade (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). 
Consequently, all parties covered faced a growing challenge to stabilize support in an era of 
mass media communications as well as high levels of citizen disengagement from traditional 
forms of political participation.   
                                                          
9 Building on earlier work, a split (or a fission) is operationalized as parties formed with the help of actors who 
defected from existing parties (Mair 1990: 132; Hug 2001: 13; Ibenskas 2018). These defectors can form part of 
the party elite or the rank-and-file. Importantly, as compared to the ‘mother party’, they take only the minority 
of the overall resources inside and outside public office with them. 





Meanwhile, to assure unit homogeneity, we deliberately focus on organizationally new 
parties that - from their organizational birth until their (potential) death - operated in already 
fully consolidated party systems (a situation that is substantially different if the majority of 
rivalling parties are organizationally new as well) (Meguid 2007). Simultaneously, the 
countries included are all established democracies with long electoral histories that allowed 
us to assess full party life cycles some of which lasted several decades before their eventual 
death. Following this rationale, we cover parties in 17 countries in Western Europe, North 
America and Australasia11, all of which were fully consolidated by 1968, the earliest possible 
‘year of birth’ in our party sample.  
The dataset includes all new parties that won a seat in national parliament in these 17 
countries between 1968-2011 at least once in their lifetime irrespective of vote share and 
ideological profile, whose vote shares varied between 0 and 37.7%. As parliamentary 
thresholds differ across countries, we complemented these by all new parties that did not win 
a seat but a minimum of 2% of the national vote at least once in their ‘life’, increasing 
inclusiveness in high threshold countries such as Germany or France. This strategy provided 
us with a highly inclusive sample of 144 parties essential to test factors influencing the risk of 




                                                          
11 These are the Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.   
12 The average vote share across all national elections parties participated in was 3.6%. The Appendix, Section 
2, provides information on the number of parties per country and the distribution of vote share across parties for 







Operationalization of Variables 
Measurement of Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable measures the length of the party’s life in years from its organizational 
foundation until its year of death or, if it is still active, up to 201113 drawing on a wide range 
of primary sources and secondary sources. In essence, death occurs when a party permanently 
stops nominating candidates for any elections (irrespective of tier) as a separate, autonomous 
organization.14 In operational terms, such ‘death’ can occur through different processes. 
Predominantly it is linked to the formal dissolution of the party (through a membership 
meeting or a formal declaration of the leadership). Alternatively, parties can cease to run 
elections by withdrawing from the electoral arena to exclusively focus on societal activities 
or merging into other organizations.15 Using these criteria, we find that 64 parties or 44 
percent of the parties in our sample died during the period under consideration.16 Figure 1 
shows the timing of death for these parties.  
 
 
                                                          
13 In alternative analyses, we also measure the party’s life from the year of the first parliamentary election in 
which it participates until its death. This does not affect the results reported below (see Appendix, Section 5). 
14 Thus, while for many parties the ceasing of national electoral participation and death coincide, this is not 
necessarily the case as parties that withdraw from national politics sometimes continue to run local or regional 
elections. 
15 Also note that temporary electoral alliances (e.g. Ibenskas 2016) do not qualify as death under our definition.  
16 Our sample shows the relevance of the conceptual distinction between organizational death and the lack of 
legislative representation:  we record 23 parties that, after losing legislative representation, survived more than 5 
years (i.e. a full legislative term). 11 of these parties were still functional in 2011. Additionally, there were 17 










Figure 1: The Distribution of Party Survival Times 
About here 
The distribution is quite diverse: some parties did not survive even a single year, one died 
after more than 39 years of continuous existence. The average lifespan is 13.0 years while the 
standard deviation is 8.4 years. In comparison, looking at the whole sample, we find that the 
average number of years that a party stays in the sample is 13.4, with the standard deviation 
of 9.9 years. The highest observed age is 42 years.  
Measurement of Independent Variables 
Starting with the variables associated with our Downsian account of party death, a new 
measure was constructed to capture the variable insider formation (Insider Formation 
Hypothesis 1.1). We coded each of our parties as 1 if a national parliamentarian (present or 
former) was involved in its formation and took on a formal role (often but not always its 
leadership) in the new party. To test the Seat Share Hypothesis (H1.2), we compiled data on 
the evolution of the number of national seats for the first house of parliament starting with the 
first national election a party nominated candidates for (earliest 1968) till the last one it 
participated in or, in case of still active parties, the last national election before 2011. We use 
the lagged natural logarithm of party’s seat share reflecting the expectation that changes in 
seat share at lower values have a stronger impact on survival than those at higher values. 
Participation in national or regional government (Government Access Hypothesis 1.3) is a 
dummy variable (values 0 and 1) and was coded for each year. Details on data sources for 





Moving to the variables linked to our sociological account of political party, we 
distinguished between new formations with and without societal roots (Societal Roots 
Hypothesis 2.1) relying on the classification of 140 new parties provided by Bolleyer 
measuring whether a party’s foundation was supported by one or several identifiable 
promoter organizations or groups or not (2013: 43-3, Table 2.2). Whether a party is an 
ideologically novel formation (Novelty Hypothesis 2.2) was measured in two steps. First, we 
identified which parties in our sample either belonged to the new Green or new right family, 
the only two genuinely new party families that – according to Mudde (2007) – established 
themselves across a wide range of established democracies. To capture whether these new 
right or Green parties brought something novel and distinct to their party systems (and thus 
were likely to take ownership of these issues in the longer term), we only coded those of them 
as ideologically novel formations (1) if they were the first party of that family – in terms of 
their year of formation - that entered their respective party system. All other parties were 
coded 0. This was suitable to measure ideological novelty since in numerous countries more 
than one new Green or new right party have emerged over the last four decades. Appendix 1 
discusses the steps in the operationalization process in detail. To operationalize our 
Distinctiveness Advantage Hypothesis (Hypothesis 2.3), we examine whether any of the 
parties with at least 1 percent of the vote represented the same ideological family as any of 
the new parties in our sample in each previous national parliamentary election throughout the 
party’s life cycle. If one or more such parties exist, we code the value of the variable 
indicating the presence of a competitor as 1. The absence of such a competitor is coded as 0. 
The variable varies in time following the emergence and/or decline of ideologically similar 







To assure the robustness of our findings we control for the following institutional variables 
earlier studies identified as relevant for new party performance. The first is the presence or 
absence of a powerful regional tier in the political system, giving parties another arena to 
operate, gain visibility and access resources on (e.g. Deschouwer 2003; Spoon 2011; Cyr 
2016; Obert and Müller 2017). To measure the strength of a political system’s regional tier 
we use the Regional Authority Index (RAI) provided by Hooghe et al (2015). The RAI 
captures the authority of regional governments in ten different areas on an annual basis for 
the period between 1950 and 2010. We include the values of this index lagged by one year to 
account for the time that it takes for any changes in regional authority to influence party 
survival and death. Second, we control for a party’s access to direct state funding important 
to maintain basic party functions (e.g. Bakke and Sitter 2015; Casal Bértoa and Spirova 
2017). We construct a time-variant variable measuring each party’s access to funding in each 
electoral cycle that it participated in during its lifespan. The variable takes the value of 1 if 
the party won sufficient votes or seats to obtain state funding (organizational or electoral) 
made available by the party finance regime in place in the respective electoral cycle and a 
score of 0 otherwise. Finally, electoral system disproportionality may also affect parties’ 
survival influencing the translation of votes into seats. We use the average district magnitude 
of the lower tier of the electoral system to measure electoral thresholds. Bormann and Golder 
(2013) is the source of this data. While alternative measures of national electoral thresholds 
have been proposed (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005), there is little research on their properties 
and suitability as measures of electoral systems. We therefore follow recent studies on new 
parties (e.g. Tavits 2006; Biezen and Rashkova 2013) and more general studies on the effects 
of electoral systems (e.g. Carey and Hix 2011) by using the average district magnitude for 





The Appendix (Section 2) presents the descriptive statistics of all variables used in the 
analysis and the correlation between three time-invariant variables (societal rootedness, initial 




We use the proportional hazard model developed by Cox (1992) to estimate the impact of the 
variables discussed above on the probability of the death of parties. We choose the Cox 
model for the analysis as it does not assume a specific probability distribution for the time 
until an event occurs (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001). To control for any country specific 
effects, we use robust standard errors clustered by country.  
A key assumption of the Cox model is that of ‘proportional hazards’, which implies that the 
ratio of hazards is constant over time. This is not to say that the risk of an event is constant, 
but rather that hazards are proportional over time. We tested this assumption using the 
Schoenfeld residuals PH test, which is a common test of the assumption of non-
proportionality. Following a standard practice when using the Cox model, statistical models 
include the interaction between a covariate and the natural logarithm of time if the statistical 
test (we use the 0.05 level of significance) indicates that the effect of this covariate is not 
time-constant.  
We explain the choice of the model and its interpretation in greater detail in the Appendix, 







Table 2 summarizes the results of the Cox regression models of party death. The first two 
models test the variables associated with each of our two theoretical conceptions separately. 
Model 3 includes variables for both perspectives. Control variables are included in all three 
models. Table 3 presents the substantive effects of the covariate variables. For the covariates 
whose significant effects are not time-constant, Table 3 shows the first differences (i.e. the 
percentage change in the hazard rate at the specific point in a party’s life related to the change 
in the values of the predictor variable) when party age is one standard deviation below the 
mean (3.5 years), at the mean value (13.5 years) and one standard deviation above the mean 
value (23.5 years) (see Appendix, Section 7, for the plots of the first differences across the 
whole range of party age).    
Our findings indicate the relevance of factors derived from both conceptions of political 
parties. Starting with the effects of factors forming part of the Downsian conception of party 
death, there is support for the notion that party formations involving parliamentarians are 
more likely to die, in line with our Insider Formation Hypothesis (1.1). Although the 
coefficient of this variable is negative, the interaction effect with time is statistically 
significant (Model 3). For very young parties (6 years or less, with 30 percent of observations 
falling in this range), insider status decreases the chances of party death. However, for parties 
that are 12 years or older (half of the observations in the sample have these values of party 
age), being an insider formation increases the chances of death. The effect is also 
substantively strong: as Table 3 shows, when the age of a party is 23.5 years (which 
represents the mean value plus one standard deviation), the hazard rate of death increases by 
more than 500 percent for insider parties compared to others. While we expected this variable 





logic. As the insider parties are formed by parliamentarians to promote their office ambitions, 
they are unlikely to be dissolved in their early years of life whilst their founders are still 
active. However, once the founders retire, these parties often struggle with a leadership 
vacuum as the former often display little interest in recruiting and promoting candidates 






Table 2: Cox PH Models of Party Death 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Downsian Account    






























Rooted Formation* ln (years)   0.69 
(0.60) 








Control Variables    






























AIC 524 519 499 
Number of parties 144 144 144 
Number of events 64 64 64 
Number of observations 2638 2638 2638 
Regression coefficients of the Cox PH model. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.  
** p< 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
National seat share has a negative effect on the chances of death in line with our Seat Share 
Hypothesis (1.2). Parties with higher seat shares – providing a core payoff for ambitious elites 
- are less likely to die (although the variable is significant at the 0.1 level of statistical 





values of this variable (logged seat share) from one standard deviation below the mean 
(representing no seats) to one standard deviation above the mean (equivalent to 4.4 percent of 
seats) decreases the hazard rate of party death by 38 percent. 
Table 3: Effects of Predictor Variables on Party Death 
Account Non-time-dependent effects 
Ln (Party Seat 
Share) 
(Downsian) -38 (-66; 3) 
Government Access (Downsian) -62 (-91; 17) 
Ideologically Novel 
Formation 
(Sociolog.) -58 (-79; -19) 
Account Time-dependent effects 
  Values of party age 
  Mean – 1 SD (3.5 
yr) 
Mean (13.5 yr) Mean + 1 SD (23.5 
yr) 
Insider Formation (Downsian) -75 (-91; -45) 138 (15; 333) 519 (162; 1168) 
Rooted Formation (Sociolog.) -75 (-97; -3) -54 (-72; -29) -30 (-71; 40) 
Strength of Regional 
Tier 
- -86 (-98; -34) -34 (-74; 48) 35 (-48; 202) 
Party Funding 
Access 
- 208 (47; 517) -49 (-73; -4) -74 (-91; -38) 
Ln (Electoral 
Threshold) 
- -57 (-76; -29) 152 (70; 255) 431 (199; 740) 
Note: First differences in the hazard rate of party death for different values of party age, simulated 
using simPH (Gandrud 2015) package in the statistical environment R based on the estimates of 
Model 3 in Table 2. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. The values of the continuous predictor 
variables are changed from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above 
the mean.  
 
In line with our Government Access Hypothesis (1.3), the coefficient of the government 
access variable is negative and significant at the 0.1 level of statistical significance (Model 3). 
Parties in government at the national and/or regional level are 62 percent less likely to die 
than those without presence in government. Thus, despite the moderately high correlation 
(0.26) between the variables measuring legislative seat share and government access, our 
model uncovers distinct effects of both variables. It therefore suggests that the elites of new 





Two factors associated with the sociological account of party death are substantively and 
statistically significant in the theoretically expected direction. First, as suggested in our 
Societal Roots Hypothesis (2.1), parties formed with the support of promoter organizations 
have much stronger chances of survival according to Model 2. Model 3 (and the first 
differences plot, see Figure 3 in Appendix 7) indicate that the effect of this variable is not 
time-constant. Specifically, party formations with societal roots have a lower risk of dying 
when the age of a party is between 3 and 18 years (60 percent of the sample has these values 
of party age) (see Appendix, Section 7, for the plots of the first differences). The effect is 
substantively strong: when the party is 13.5 years old (the mean value of party age), the risk 
of death is 54 percent lower than for parties being formed without the support of pre-existing 
groups. This finding echoes classical work stressing the importance of party ties to mobilized 
societal groups representing specific interests (e.g. Duverger 1959; Panebianco 1988; Rose 
and Mackie 1988). That societal roots are particularly advantageous in earlier phases of new 
parties’ life cycles makes sense as the formation of an organization and the building of 
loyalties are resource-intense and time-consuming. In earlier phases, rooted parties have 
advantages to achieve this as compared to organizations formed without external support. 
Over time, the latter formations have the chance to ‘catch up’ building a resilient organization 
through accessing other resources, which means that the difference between rooted formation 
and those without societal backup loses relevance for their risk of death in later stages of new 
party evolution.  
Second, the Ideological Novelty Hypothesis (2.2) is also supported. Specifically, based on 
Model 3, the risk of death for such parties is 58 percent lower than that for the other parties. 
This finding is in line with a wide range of earlier empirical studies stressing the importance 
of ideology for new parties to carve out their own, separate niche to survive as organizations 





ideological novelty helps parties to survive by mobilising their members and core supporters 
rather than assuring them with electoral support. Indeed, the ideological novelty hypothesis is 
supported in Model 3 while controlling for the variables capturing a party’s parliamentary 
seat share and access to government. Although the latter variable affects the chances of a 
party’s survival, among the parties with few or no legislative seats, ideologically novel 
parties are more likely to survive due to the commitment of ideologically motivated activists. 
Interestingly, unlike the advantages enjoyed by rooted formations or the disadvantages 
associated with insider formations, the positive effect of novelty does not diminish over time.  
In contrast, the emergence of competitor parties that represent the same party family as the 
new party does not increase the probability of its death. Our Distinctiveness Advantage 
Hypothesis (2.3) does not find support (this null result holds when using several alternative 
measures of ideological proximity, as explained in Section 6 of the Appendix). This indicates 
that being the only credible representative of a particular ideology does not help a party to 
survive. 
Our controls capturing regional, party funding and electoral institutions on party death are 
significant, which underscore the robustness of our main findings. First, echoing earlier work 
(Deschouwer 2003), new parties are more likely to survive in institutional settings with a 
strong regional tier, but this variable is important only for the parties that are 8 years or 
younger. Second, the effect of the access to party funding is also time-dependent, although 
largely in line with what earlier work would lead us to expect. Interestingly, in comparison to 
the parties that received no state funding, parties entitled to state funding are more likely to 
die when they are young (up to 5 years) but less likely to die when they are 12 years or older. 
The positive effect of this variable may be a consequence of the infighting between core 





however, is substantively more important and stresses the importance of financial resources 
for parties’ long-term maintenance (e.g. Casal Bértoa and Spirova 2017). Finally, a higher 
district magnitude (i.e. a more permissive electoral system with lower electoral thresholds) 
decreases the probability of the death of young parties (5 years or less) but makes the death of 
older parties (8 years or more) more likely. In the early years of a party’s existence, more 
proportional electoral institutions tend to decrease the chances of death as the translation of 
votes into seats is more favourable. Yet once a party grows older in such permissive systems, 
it has to compete with a higher number of parties, making it less likely that it can stabilize its 
support in the long run. 
 
Discussion 
Why do some political parties that emerge in advanced democracies fade away by ceasing to 
nominate candidates in elections while others manage to survive? To address this question, 
we developed two contrasting sets of hypotheses on party death derived from two prominent 
conceptions of political parties, which allows us to provide an encompassing perspective on 
this important phenomenon. According to the Downsian conception, political parties are 
vehicles for career-oriented politicians who seek to maximise their legislative and executive 
office. The failure of the party to provide these benefits leads to its demise as the rationale of 
core actors in the party to sustain it disappears. The sociological conception views parties as 
societal organizations that serve representational functions valued in themselves by their 
members and supporters. The party is therefore more likely to survive if it was formed by a 
promoter organization or represented a distinct ideological position, both at the time of its 





We examined our hypotheses applying survival analysis to a new dataset covering 144 new 
parties in 17 democracies. As to be expected, some arguments derived from either conception 
hold, although we find somewhat stronger evidence for the Downsian perspective. 
Specifically, in line with this approach, our empirical analysis suggests that insider parties 
(i.e. parties formed by parliamentarians) are less likely, while parties with a higher share of 
legislative seats and access to government office are more likely to survive. The two 
formative characteristics of the party associated with the sociological perspective – support 
by a societal promoter organisation and ideological novelty – also increased the chances of 
party survival. Finally, controls capturing federal, party funding and electoral institutions 
influenced party death and survival indicating the robustness of our findings. 
Through the careful theoretical and empirical analysis of party political death, we contribute 
to a key debate in the party politics literature: the nature of political parties. The dominant 
view of political parties as coalitions of office-seekers has been recently challenged or 
complemented by the arguments that see parties as first and foremost representatives of social 
groups or ideologies (Hanson 2010; Mudge and Chen 2014). The systematic examination of 
the drivers of the death of new parties as organisations (as opposed to their electoral 
performance) over more than four decades provides a unique window to address this 
question. Our analysis strengthens the case for a more balanced understanding of parties by 
showing that societal and ideological roots of parties matter for their survival even when 
controlling for their electoral success and access to governmental office.  
Our results also emphasise an interesting dynamic regarding the effect of the variables that 
capture parties’ characteristics related to their formation as opposed to those that capture their 
ability to achieve their central goals later in their life. In line with classical arguments 





organization in the long term (Panebianco 1988), we find that societal rootedness, ideological 
novelty and insider status all have a strong effect on party survival. Thus, the length of 
parties’ survival can be predicted to large extent at the time of their formation. Parties that are 
formed by parliamentarians without the support of a promoter organisation and novel 
ideological profile are unlikely to survive more than several electoral terms unless they 
achieve consistent electoral success and access to government. In contrast, parties with strong 
societal and ideological roots are likely to survive for relatively long periods of time even 
without having access to legislative and executive office.  
While for methodological reasons we tested our theoretical framework using a sample of new 
parties in established party systems, it is also useful for understanding the survival and death 
of parties not included in our empirical analysis. Both theoretical accounts developed here 
explain why, despite substantial electoral change in established democracies, the death of 
older parties (those established prior to the 1960s) embedded in established party systems has 
been a rare occurrence. From the Downsian perspective, the overwhelming survival of these 
parties can be explained by the fact that they retain substantial legislative representation, 
often participate in government and only in few cases were formed by parliamentarians. From 
the sociological perspective, these parties often started their existence as expressions of 
various societal interests and were also the sole representatives of their respective ideologies. 
Even if some of them have been reduced to minor legislative parties in the wake of recent 
economic crises, the sociological perspective suggests that their organizational survival is 
highly likely. 
Finally, with some adaptations, our framework can be made useful for understanding party 
survival and death in countries with less stable party systems such as in Central and Eastern 





persistence of parties there (Grzymala-Busse 2006; Tavits 2013), research on the 
organizational survival and death of parties has been less prominent (but see Bakke and Sitter 
2015; Casal Bértoa and Spirova 2017; Obert and Müller 2017). In line with our Downsian 
account, Obert and Müller (2017) find that legislative representation reduces the chances of 
party death, so does access to state funding. However, there is less theoretical and empirical 
research on the factors related to the sociological account, which could provide new insights 
into the ‘fleeting parties’ phenomenon observed in many younger democracies (Spirova 
2007; Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2015). While many of these parties lack clear ideologies 
(Sikk 2011), anecdotal evidence suggests that those parties that have strong ties with societal 
organisations (e.g. many ethnic parties) or have presented a novel ideological profile (e.g. 
Green parties in the Czech Republic, Estonia and Lithuania) are less likely to die. 
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